

Foreword

The critical thinker, dedicated in his commitment to a particular school of thought, will be heartened, perhaps even inspired and guided, by the felicitous phrase, traditionally attributed to Aristotle, "I love Plato, but I love the truth more." This certainly can be said of the author of the papers collected in these volumes. Once lauded by James Hillman as the person doing "the most important Jungian *thought* now going on,"¹ Wolfgang Giegerich has for more than three decades dedicated himself to what he has called "thinking the Jungian myth onwards."² A lover of Jung's psychology, especially on account of what he has praised as its authentic notion of soul,³ Giegerich has at the same time been compelled by an even greater regard for truth to become its most exacting critic. Sometimes, as Giegerich has told me, this task has proven as difficult as "cutting into [his] own flesh."⁴ Seminal thoughts of Jung's, in which he as a Jungian analyst has had a personal stake, have had to be rigorously interrogated. But this is as it must be, for only as Jung's psychology is reflected into itself in the light of its internal contradictions can its vaporized essence be alchemically distilled and the elixir within it found.

Now it is important to emphasize that the truth that is to be loved more than Plato, Jung, or any other thinker is not a truth imported from outside. As what Giegerich calls "the discipline of interiority," psychology works strictly by means of the application of the theory in question or matter at hand *to itself*. Eschewing external touchstones (i.e., the validity standards of other disciplines), a psychology that is truly psychological in its form and approach proceeds by means of *internal* reflection, *immanent* critique, reading Plato in terms of Plato, Jung in terms of Jung--dreams, symptoms, and other phenomena in terms of themselves as well.

Clearly, the contrast that sets off psychology as just described from scientifically-conceived

approaches that operate in terms of the idea of objectivity and external verification could not be stronger. And further to this it could be said that from the former's point of view, scientific psychology is to be adjudged as having been set-up from the outset in terms of a fallacy. Committed to an external form of reflection, scientific approaches assign the epithet "inner" to such phenomena as images, emotions, and memories, while continuing naively to view these as if they were simply out there in front of consciousness, unadulterated and pure.

But how then, if not by science, are we to proceed? How can psychology get to interiority or "the soul" from within itself, right from the start?

Working by means of what is known in philosophy as transcendental deduction, Kant launched his critical philosophy by asking how the mind must be constituted for it to be possible for us to have the kinds of experience that we do. Psychology, working with a more colloquial form of the same style of argumentation, asks similar questions with respect to its ideas, its theories.

Examples are legion, there being no particular kind of phenomena that psychology has to be about. As we have already indicated, all that is required is that the subject matter, whatever that may be, is taken subjectively or hermeneutically in terms of itself.

Humming a few bars of this music, a fanciful series of colloquially-expressed, transcendental deduction-type questions come readily to mind.

What does psychology's having formulated the ideas that it has say about its conception of itself? And how do the scales stand in their balance when each is weighed against itself as against a feather? Is there a remainder left over when the math is done? Something extra that must now be accounted for through subsequent acts of reflection? The review in the journal, we may ask more specifically, has it a hefty enough handle for the blade that it wields? The procedure we have invented, the operation we have performed, can these still to be rated a success given that the

patient died? And the smoke of this cigar even, is it as weighty in its own new way as the Havana that first gave it off?

“Never forget,” advised Jung, “that in psychology the *means* by which you judge the psyche is the *psyche* itself.”⁵

A few sentences from Hegel, the philosopher most referenced by Giegerich, may be cited here. The first of these merely expresses the logical form of the questions we have just asked: “...in what consciousness within its own self designates as the *An sich* or the true, [in this] we have the standard by which consciousness itself proposes to measure its knowledge.”⁶ The second helps us to understand, with Hegel and Giegerich, that reflection, far from needing to be rejected when it does not measure up to itself, must think its contradictions on a whole new level, transforming itself thereby: “...the Absolute [as the sublated form of the contradictions that have given rise to it,] is ... the identity of identity and non-identity, opposition and unity are both in it.”⁷

In the papers that follow, topics as diverse as Neumann's fanciful history of consciousness, analytical psychology's theory of projection, Jung's thought of the self, and the question of a Jungian identity are reflexively applied to themselves in the manner just described. The upshot of this is that in each case the topic under consideration ceases to be a mere subject matter *of* psychology. While certainly remaining this on one level, each becomes, by virtue of its having been reflected into itself, an illuminating commentary with respect to the greater question of how a psychology that can think on its own authority, out of the depth of its own notion, constitutes itself. As Giegerich has expressed this, “What at first appears as a content of consciousness [e.g. the aforementioned topics *of* psychology] is in truth the seed of what wants to be a new form of consciousness at large.”⁸

The account that I have just given of the reflexive movement that is at play in this first volume of

Giegerich's English papers applies as well across all four. Indeed, as the reader will discover as he or she takes up *The Nuclear Bomb Papers* (vol. 2), *Soul-Violence* (vol. 3), and *The Soul Always Thinks* (vol. 4) in their turn, the new form of psychological consciousness that began as a seed with the title paper of the present volume, "The Neurosis of Psychology," comes increasingly to the fore.

We started with an adage from Aristotle about his love of truth being greater than his love of Plato. This we then extended to Jung. Turning now to Giegerich's papers, we may restate this adage again, this time with psychology as the subject. Usually, psychology is taken to be identical with the things to which it is applied, that is, to psychic phenomena of various kinds. The difference between such phenomena in their *positivity* and the logic of psychology as *negativity* or reflection into itself is not recognized, not drawn. Instead, we have a proliferation of different psychologies. The problem here, as Giegerich has pointed out, is that each of these so-called psychologies proceeds as if psychology could simply be found out there in the objects it empirically observes. Such naivety, however, drastically short-changes Jung's crucial insight that all experience is psychically mediated such that no phenomenon, whether "inner" or "outer," is immediately observable apart from the constitution of consciousness itself. Returning to this insight (even hoisting Jung upon it at times, as upon his own petard), Giegerich has shown that it is precisely because all phenomena are reflected from the outset that the question of their logic, the question of their truth, arises. We cannot, as Giegerich has argued, simply have psychology--"just like that"--in the form of the phenomenal topics that interest us, but only as, in the case of each of these, and through critique of each one's seeming immediacy, we come to love truth more.

If there is a thread through the labyrinthine turns of Giegerich's collected papers, it is to be found in our recognition that Giegerich's most important contribution to psychology resides in his having rigorously thought psychology through in terms of the "psychological difference" that I have just

described. Taking this thread up now in our turn, may we, as the lovers of this phenomena or that psychology, yet learn with Giegerich that a truly psychological psychology can only be founded through our loving the truth more.

Greg Mogenson
Series Editor

References

¹ James Hillman, "Once More into the Fray: A Response to Wolfgang Giegerich's 'Killings'." *Spring 56* (1994), p. 1.

² Wolfgang Giegerich, "The 'Patriarchal Neglect of the Feminine Principle': A Psychological Fallacy in Jungian Theory," *Harvest: Journal for Jungian Studies* 45.1 (1999), p. 7.

³ Wolfgang Giegerich, *The Soul's Logical Life: Towards a Rigorous Notion of Psychology* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1998), pp. 39-43.

⁴ Personal communication, October 20, 2000.

⁵ C.G. Jung, *CW* 18: 277.

⁶ Cited in Charles Taylor, *Hegel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 135.

⁷ Cited in Taylor, *Hegel*, p. 67.

⁸ Wolfgang Giegerich, "Is the Soul 'Deep?'--Entering and Following the Logical Movement in Heraclitus' 'Fragment 45.'" *Spring 64* (Fall/Winter, 1998), p. 19.